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We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on adaptive networks of
player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy
model wherein each player follows one strategy at a time (cooperate or defect) across all of its neighbors,
changing that strategy and possibly changing partners in response to local changes in the network of
player pairing and in the strategies used by connected partners. We compare and contrast numerical
simulations with existing pair approximation differential equations for describing this system, as well
as more accurate equations developed here using the framework of approximate master equations. We
explore the parameter space of the model, demonstrating the relatively high accuracy of the approximate
master equations for describing the system observations made from simulations. We study two variations
of this partner-switching model to investigate the system evolution, predict stationary states, and compare
the total utilities and other qualitative differences between these two model variants.
Keywords: Evolutionary games; prisoner’s dilemma; adaptive networks; network dynamics; approximate
master equations
1. Introduction
Game theory is the study of strategic decision making and the analysis of mathematical models of con-
flict and cooperation between intelligent rational participants [13, 17, 36]. Game theory is used in a
variety of disciplines, including biology, economics, political science, computer science, and psychol-
ogy. In classical game theory, rational actors make their choices to optimize their individual payoffs.
That is, actors make strategic choices on a rationally determined evaluation of probable outcomes, or
utility, considering the strategic analysis that the players’ opponents are making in determining their
own choices. Evolutionary game theory [21, 24, 39, 57, 68], the application of game theory to evolv-
ing populations, has recently expanded from consideration of lifeforms in biology to various areas in
social science. Evolutionary game theory is useful in this context by defining a framework of contests,
strategies, behaviors, and analytics in which competition can be modeled. The key point in evolutionary
game theory is that the success of a strategy is not just determined by how good the strategy is in itself;
rather, it is a question of how good the strategy is in the presence of other alternative strategies and of
the distribution of those other strategies within a population.
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One of the great difficulties of Darwinian theory, recognized by Darwin himself, was the problem of
altruism [35]; in particular, exploited cooperators are worse off than defectors. Hence, according to the
basic principles of Darwinian selection, intuitively it seems almost certain that cooperation should go
extinct. If the basis for selection is at the individual level, the phenomenon of altruism is often hard to
interpret. And selection at the group level, or for the “greater good,” appears to violate the game theory
assumption of individuals maximizing their own utility. Indeed, altruism is certainly not found to be
the general case in nature. Nevertheless, altruistic behaviors can be found in many social animals and,
indeed, can be fundamental for some species to survive [7].
The solution to this apparent paradox can be demonstrated in the application of evolutionary game
theory to the prisoner’s dilemma game [2, 34], a game which tests the outcomes of “cooperating” versus
“defecting.” Cooperation is usually analyzed in game theory by means of a non-zero-sum game. The
prisoner’s dilemma game, one of the most studied systems in all of game theory, is a standard example
that shows why two completely rational individuals may not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in
their best collective interest to do so. Within evolutionary game theory, the analysis of the prisoner’s
dilemma is as an iterative game [33], with the repetitive nature affording competitors the possibility
of retaliating or defecting based on the results of previous rounds of the game. There are a multitude
of strategies which have been tested by the mathematics of evolutionary game theory and in computer
simulations of contests (see, e.g., [8]), with the general conclusion that the most effective competitive
strategies are typically cooperative with a reserved retaliatory response as necessary. The most famous
and one of the most successful of these strategies is “Tit for Tat,” which carries out this approach by
executing a simple algorithm [2, 37].
In recent years, games played on various random graphs and social networks have been investi-
gated [1, 6, 10, 11, 20, 23, 26, 29, 31, 38, 50, 54]. For example, the public goods game can be seen
as a generalization of multiplayer N-player games and group interactions such as pattern formation and
self-organization could be studied through this extension [18, 46, 62]. The studies devoted to evolution-
ary games on complex networks are extensive. Speaking generally, the goals of such studies typically
include identifying which combination of game rules, dynamics, and various network topologies can
provide cooperation among selfish and unrelated individuals. In the present work, we focus on the
dynamical role of players having the option to switch partners, as studied in the framework of adaptive
networks that coevolve with the player strategies [42, 43, 48, 59–61]. On a “coevolving” or “adap-
tive” network with a game, the vertices represent players and the edges denote the pairings, or game
interactions, between players.
Importantly, the spatial structures in a network could enable cooperators to form small groups or
clusters to protect themselves against exploitation by defectors [38]. Studies have shown that the spatial
structure can promote cooperation [27], but there is also evidence that suggests that spatial structure
may not necessarily favor cooperation [20]. Other studies have elaborated on different aspects of coop-
eration on scale-free [15, 45, 51], square-lattice [49, 53], small-world [30, 55, 63], social and real-world
networks [9, 25, 32], and multilayer networks [67]. Insofar as the player pairing network is part of a
larger social setting, other notable rules encouraging cooperative behavior are kin selection [16], group
selection [5, 65], direct reciprocity [44], indirect reciprocity [40, 41], social diversity [47, 56, 69], vol-
untary participation [4, 19, 22], reputation [10], and frequency of breaking cooperator-defector bonds
and rewiring [60, 61]. All of these have been studied as interesting mechanisms that may promote
cooperation in evolutionary games.
In this paper, we focus our study on a simple coevolving network model for how players play a
prisoner’s dilemma game with the ability to adapt by changing their strategies or switching partners if
they are exploited by their neighbors, introduced in [11]. We are interested in exploring the cooperative
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level among the individuals as they organize into networks of cooperators. By using the technique of
approximate master equations, we provide a more accurate approximation of the evolution of the net-
work structure and player states with which to explore the parameter space of the model. We compare
the existing analytical methods and our new approximation, providing qualitative and quantitative esti-
mations of various network properties. In Section 2, we introduce the model. We then describe our more
accurate approximation in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide numerical results and compare the two
approximation methods. In Section 5, we introduce a variation to the model and compare the results of
the two variants of the model. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Description of the CD-switching model
We study the partner switching model introduced by Fu et al. [11], where vertices of the coevolving net-
work represent players, edges denote the pairing of individuals playing the game, and players adapting
by changing strategies based on their current local information or switching partners. For simplicity,
we initialize our simulations with an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N nodes and M edges, with each node
assigned an initial state either as a cooperator (C) or defector (D). Each node uses a single strategy
across all of its links, though that strategy can change over time as we describe below. That is, individ-
ual i playing with all of her connections obtains an income
Pi = ∑
j∈Ni
sTi Ps j,
whereNi is the neighborhood set of i and the 2-by-2 payoff matrix P is
C D( )
C 1 0
D 1+u u
with cost-benefit ratio u ∈ (0,1) determining the relative outcomes in the payoff matrix. That is, if
players i and j in a pairing both play C, then both receive the payoff 1 from this pairing; if player i plays
C and player j plays D, then player i gets payoff 0 and player j gets payoff 1+u; and so on.
Each time step of our microsimulation proceeds as follows. We uniformly at random pick one
of the edges that connects a pair of players with different strategies, i.e., a CD link, denoted by Ei j.
(In Section 5, we study a variant of the model where both CD and DD links are considered.) With
probability w (specified as a parameter), the two nodes i and j connected by edge Ei j consider updating
their strategies; otherwise (i.e., with probability 1−w), the edge Ei j is rewired. When a node reassesses
its strategy along the edge Ei j, the node has probability φ specified by the Fermi function to change
its state, as first proposed by [58], as specified in detail below. When link Ei j is rewired, the player
with end state C unilaterally drops the partnership with its neighbor with end state D on the edge Ei j
and picks (uniformly at random) another player from the remaining population outside its immediate
neighborhood as its new partner. The left panel of Fig. 1 illustrates this rewiring process.
When a strategy updating event occurs, nodes i and j each consider their play across all of their
neighbors, observing their total payoffs Pi and Pj. Then the strategy of node j replaces that of i along
the edge Ei j—that is, i copies j’s strategy—with probability given by the Fermi function
φ(si← s j) = 11+ exp[α(Pi−Pj)] ,
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FIG. 1. Illustrations of the rewiring and strategy updating processes. Pick a discordant edge XY with node X in state C and node
Y in state D. (Left) Rewiring occurs with probability 1−w with cooperating node X dismissing its defecting neighbor Y and
rewiring to a random node Z in the network, independent of the state of node Z. If Z is in state D, then the number of CD edges
remains the same; but if Z is cooperating (as in the picture), then the number of CD edges has been reduced. (Right) Strategy
updating occurs with probability w. Nodes X and Y compare their utilities, with one node copying the other as selected according
to the Fermi function of the difference of utilities. In the example depicted here, suppose the cost-benefit ratio u = 0.5 and the
Fermi function bias parameter α = 30. Then node X has utility PX = 1, node Y has utility PY = 4, and the Fermi function gives
φ(sX ← sY ) = 1/(1+ exp[α(PX −PY )]) = 1/(1+ exp[30(1−4)]) ≈ 1, so that node X is selected with probability close to 1 to
imitate node Y ’s strategy (state D).
where α modifies the intensity of the bias towards the strategy with the higher payoff [12, 64]. Otherwise
[that is, with probability φ(s j ← si) = 1−φ(si← s j)], j copies i. The value of 1/α can be interpreted
here as representing the amplitude of noise in the strategy updating process [52, 66]; that is, α → 0
ignores the payoffs while α → ∞ yields deterministic imitation of the node receiving the higher payoff.
The right panel of Fig. 1 illustrates the strategy updating process.
This partner switching evolutionary game stops when there are no discordant edges remaining in the
network. That is, only CC and DD edges exist in the final state of the system, with the final network
fissioning these two groups (cooperative and defective) into different components. In Fig. 2, we visualize
a simulated network shortly before fission occurs, showing strong grouping of nodes by strategies.
We note that recent work [28] studied a spatially-embedded extension of the partner switching model
in [11], introducing a range of rewiring distance and finding that a preference for global partner switch-
ing can coevolve with cooperation. However, in the present contribution we consider only random
rewiring partner switching.
3. Semi-analytical methods of approximation
We study this generalized coevolving network model with simulations and approximate model equa-
tions. The frameworks of Mean Field theory (MF), Pair Approximation equations (PA) and Approxi-
mate Master Equations (AME) have all been used effectively in similar settings. The PA equations for
these dynamics were obtained by [11]. Among these three levels of approximation, AME can often be
used to achieve the greatest accuracy [14], motivating us to develop the AME system here.
For comparison with the AME system that we will specify, we first look at the PA equations derived
in [11], describing the dynamics of the quantities NX and NXY —where X ,Y ∈ {C,D}—that count the
numbers of nodes and edges corresponding to the two node states. For example, NC denotes the number
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FIG. 2. Visualization of the CD-switching coevolving network model shortly before the network fissions into two disconnected
components, one including all of the remaining cooperator nodes (blue) and the other containing only defecting nodes (red). This
simulation contains N = 1,000 nodes and M = 5,000 edges, with cost-benefit ratio u= 0.5, strategy updating probability w= 0.1,
and initial fraction of defectors ρ = 0.5. This visualization was created using the Yifan Hu layout in Gephi [3].
of cooperators and NCC denotes the number of CC links in the network. While the node states and
network topology coevolve, the total numbers of nodes (N) and edges (M) remain conserved by the
specified dynamics, requiring NC +ND = N and NCC +NCD +NDD = M. The evolution of these counts
is then obtained through a moment closure approximating triple counts NXY Z—where X ,Y,Z ∈{C,D}—
in terms of the edge counts NCC, NCD and NDD. Specifically, NXXY is approximated by the product of XX
links and the average number of XY links that an X node has, i.e. NXY/NX , hence NXXY = 2NXX NXY/NX .
The resulting PA equations [11] are as follows:
dNC
dt
= w ·NCD · tanh
[
α
2
(piC−piD)
]
dNCC
dt
= w ·
(
NCDφC→D−2NCD NCCNC φD→C +NCD
NCD
ND
φC→D
)
+(1−w) · NC
N
NCD
dNDD
dt
= w ·
(
NCDφD→C−2NCD NDDND φC→D+NCD
NCD
NC
φD→C
)
,
(3.1)
where w is the probability of strategy updating (versus edge rewiring), piC = 1 ·2NCC/NC +0 ·NCD/ND
is the average utility of C nodes, piD = (1+u) ·NCD/ND+u ·2NDD/ND is the average utility of D nodes,
φC→D = 1/(1+ exp[α(piD−piC)]), φD→C = 1/(1+ exp[α(piC−piD)]), and α controls the intensity of
selection.
The AME method has been successfully used to approximate various processes on static and coe-
volving networks. The difficulty in deriving the AME system for the dynamics studied here is that the
present transition probabilities depend on more than nearest neighbor states. For comparison, in the SIS
6 of 24
model the recovery rate of an infected (I) node and the probability of infection along a given SI edge
are both specified as constant parameters. Similarly, in typical voter model dynamics, the probability
for a node to change its state relies on its neighbors’ opinions. In contrast, in the partner switching
evolutionary game studied here, the local information impacting the decision of a node to change its
state includes its total utility and that of its neighbors, which depend on the states of the neighbors’
neighbors. Since the binary-state AME framework only includes the node states, degrees, and neighbor
states, we need estimate neighbors’ utilities in terms of these limited quantities. We will explain how
we approximate these utilities after we introduce the equations below.
Let Ck,l(t) and Dk,l(t), respectively, be the number of cooperating and defecting nodes of degree k
with l defecting neighbors at time t. We note that the numbers of nodes using each strategy are then
given by the zeroth moments of the Ck,l(t) and Dk,l(t) distributions, NC = ∑kl Ck,l and ND = ∑kl Dk,l .
Meanwhile, the first moments give the numbers of edges of each type: NCC = 12 ∑kl(k− l)Ck,l , NCD =
∑kl lCk,l =∑kl(k− l)Dk,l and NDD = 12 ∑kl lDk,l . Importantly, while the node states and network topology
coevolve, the total numbers of nodes and edges remain conserved by the specified dynamics, requiring
NC +ND = N and NCC +NCD+NDD = M.
The AME system of ordinary differential equations governing the Ck,l(t) and Dk,l(t) compartments
is of course more complicated than the (relatively) compact PA equations (3.1). In the following para-
graphs, we describe each of the terms that appear in this AME system:
dCk,l
dt
= w
{
φDk,l · (k− l)Dk,l−φCk,l · lCk,l
+φCD←CC · γC(l+1)Ck,l+1−φCD←CC · γClCk,l
+φCC←CD ·βC(k− l+1)Ck,l−1−φCC←CD ·βC(k− l)Ck,l
}
+(1−w)
{
NC
N
[
(l+1)Ck,l+1− lCk,l
]
+
NCD
N
[
Ck−1,l−Ck,l
]}
,
(3.2)
dDk,l
dt
= w
{
−φDk,l · (k− l)Dk,l +φCk,l · lCk,l
+φDD←DC · γD(l+1)Dk,l+1−φDD←DC · γDlDk,l
+φDC←DD ·βD(k− l+1)Dk,l−1−φDC←DD ·βD(k− l)Dk,l
}
+(1−w)
{[
(k− l+1)Dk+1,l− (k− l)Dk,l
]
+
NCD
N
[
Dk−1,l−Dk,l
]}
.
(3.3)
To describe the AME derivation, we focus on explaining the Ck,l equation, as the effects of correspond-
ing terms of the Dk,l equation are similar. The first three lines of equation (3.2), pre-multiplied by w,
are the effect of strategy updating, while the last line with 1−w are the effect of rewiring. To write the
AME system, we track all counts flowing in and out of “center” class, Ck,l . As visualized in Fig. 3, there
are six such flows for the Ck,l compartment, yielding the first six terms in the Ck,l equation. The first
term describes the rate at which Dk,l nodes change to Ck,l through comparing its utility with one of its C
neighbors, with the Fermi function evaluation φDk,l as estimated below. Similarly, the second term cap-
tures Ck,l nodes changing strategy to become Dk,l after comparing their utility with their D neighbors,
with Fermi function evaluation φCk,l also estimated below.
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FIG. 3. Illustration of transitions to and from the Ck,l and Dk,l compartments (cooperating and defecting nodes, respectively, with
degree k and l defecting neighbors) in the system of Approximate Master Equations due to players updating their strategies. For
each compartment, only a subset of neighbors in the corresponding ego network are depicted here, to signal the essential changes
corresponding to each flow. The term describing each flow is indicated above/below the corresponding red line connecting
compartments.
To estimate these Fermi function transition probabilities, we can directly compute the utility of the
center node, since we know the numbers and types of its neighbors; but we need to estimate neighbors’
utilities in terms of the limited information available in the AME framework. Recall that the payoff
matrix of our Prisoner’s dilemma game is
C D( )
C 1 0
D 1+u u
where u ∈ (0,1). For transitions by a strategy update out of the Dk,l class, the center node is of state D,
with k neighbors, l of which are of state D. Hence we can compute the center’s utility as
PD = l ·u+(k− l) · (1+u).
Since we do not have any information about the neighbors of the C neighbors of these Dk,l nodes, we
approximate utility by estimating the numbers and types of the neighbors of a C neighbor. Specifically,
we denote the expected number of C neighbors of this C neighbor by ηD, and the expected number of
D neighbors of a C neighbor by βD+1, where ηD and βD will be estimated below and the +1 accounts
for the Dk,l node itself. The estimate of the utility of the C neighbor thus becomes
PˆC = ηD ·1+(βD+1) ·0,
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and we compare the center node Dk,l’s utility with the estimate from one of its C neighbors via the Fermi
function, so that the estimated probability of the Dk,l node changing its state in this consideration is
φDk,l =
1
1+ exp[α(PD− PˆC)]
=
1
1+ exp[α(lu+(k− l)(1+u)−ηD)] .
Meanwhile, transitions by a strategy update out of the Ck,l rely on the utility of a Ck,l node,
PC = l ·0+(k− l) ·1 ,
and estimating the utility of one of the D neighbors via the numbers and types of its neighbors. We
denote the expected number of C neighbors of this D neighbor (including the Ck,l node in question) by
γC + 1, and the number of D neighbors of this D neighbor as δC, both of which will be estimated below.
With this notation, the expected utility of one of the D neighbors is
PˆD = (γC +1) · (1+u)+δC ·u ,
and the Fermi function estimate for the probability of the Ck,l node changing its state in this comparison
becomes
φCk,l =
1
1+ exp[α(PC− PˆD)]
=
1
1+ exp[α(k− l− (γC +1)(1+u)+δCu)] .
The third to sixth terms in the Ck,l equation are the effects of one of the neighbors changing its state
and thus leading to a change of the total quantity of Ck,l . Similar to the above, in order to make estimates
of the transition probabilities we need a variety of estimates of the numbers and types of the neighbors’
neighbors, which we denote as follows. We use βC to provide the expected number of D neighbors of a
CC edge, as
βC =
∑k,l(k− l)lCk,l
∑k,l(k− l)Ck,l
.
Similarly, βD denotes the expected number of D neighbors of the C node in a CD edge by
βD =
∑k,l l2Ck,l
∑k,l lCk,l
.
Meanwhile, γC and γD estimate the numbers of C neighbors of the D node of a CD edge or of a DD
edge, respectively:
γC =
∑k,l(k− l)2Dk,l
∑k,l(k− l)Dk,l
,
γD =
∑k,l l(k− l)Dk,l
∑k,l lDk,l
.
Similarly, δC and δD provide the expected numbers of D neighbors of the D node of a CD edge or of a
DD edge, respectively, while ηC and ηD give the numbers of C neighbors of a CC edge or the C node
of a CD edge, respectively:
δC =
∑k,l(k− l)lDk,l
∑k,l(k− l)Dk,l
,
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δD =
∑k,l l2Dk,l
∑k,l lDk,l
,
ηC =
∑k,l(k− l)2Ck,l
∑k,l(k− l)Ck,l
,
ηD =
∑k,l l(k− l)Ck,l
∑k,l lCk,l
.
To compute the corresponding φ transition probability in each term, let us first consider the Fermi
function factors on the second line in equation (3.2) specified by
φCD←CC =
1
1+ exp[α(PCD←CCD −piC)]
,
where
PCD←CCD = (γ
C +1) · (1+u)+δC ·u
and
piC = 1 · 2NCCNC +0 ·
NCD
NC
.
That is, this transition probability considers a D neighbor of the center Ck,l class, and we suppose this
D neighbor has γC +1 neighbors in state C (including the center Ck,l node) and δC in state D. Then we
estimate this D node’s utility and compare it with its typical C neighbor (that is, the average utility piC).
We note for emphasis here that other choices could have been made in this estimate; specifically,
we explicitly know that one of the C neighbors of this D node is the center Ck,l node. An alternative
formulation of the AME system could be formed that separates out the state change of the D neighbor
in comparison with the Ck,l center (thus removing the +1 contribution) from its state changes through
interaction with other C nodes. In order to keep the equations just a little simpler, and because of the
good approximation we observe in our results below, we continue to employ the simpler estimate here.
We similarly estimate the Fermi function factors on the third line in equation (3.2) as
φCC←CD =
1
1+ exp[α(PCC←CDC −piD)]
,
where
PCC←CDC = (η
C +1) ·1+βC ·0
and
piD = (1+u) · NCDND +u ·
2NDD
ND
.
In analogy to the above argument, we consider a C neighbor of the center Ck,l class and suppose this C
node has ηC +1 neighbors in state C (including the center node) and βC in state D. We estimate this C
node’s utility and compare it with the average utility of a D node, piD.
The last line in the Ck,l equation (3.2) describes the rewiring effect. The class Ck,l+1 flows to Ck,l
when the center node C drops one of its defecting neighbors and rewires randomly to another C. Simi-
larly, the Ck,l count decreases when the center node C drops one of its defecting neighbors and rewires
randomly to another C. If the rewiring instead links to another D node, these counts do not change.
Finally, a Ck−1,l node becomes Ck,l if it is the recipient of a rewired edge (from another C node), while
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FIG. 4. Illustrations of nodes undergoing active and passive rewiring. (Left) Active rewiring: before the rewiring, node X is in
class Ck,l (cooperator of degree k with l defecting neighbors). Suppose one of X’s discordant edges is selected and X actively
breaks that edge shared with a defective neighbor, rewiring to a random node in the network. If node X rewires to a node of state
C (as depicted here), then node X moves to class Ck,l−1. We recall that only C nodes actively rewire in the present model. (Right)
Passive rewiring: before the rewiring, node X is in class Ck,l . Suppose in the rewiring process, node X is passively rewired through
the activity of another C node in the network. Then node X moves to class Ck+1,l .
the Ck,l count decreases if a Ck,l receives a rewired edge. The first group of square-bracketed terms on
this line corresponds to the center node actively rewiring to some other node in the network while the
second group in square brackets describes the center node passively receiving a rewired edge through the
action of some other node in the network. Fig. 3 illustrates these active and passive rewiring processes.
Shifting our focus to the six flows in and out of the set depicted in the center of the lower row
of Fig. 3, we similarly obtain equation (3.3) for the Dk,l compartment. The resulting system contains
2(kmax +1)2 coupled differential equations, where kmax is the maximum degree a node can have in the
network. Usually, the necessary value of kmax for good accuracy depends on network structure and
the mean degree. Here we choose kmax = 50. We numerically solve these differential equations to
semi-analytically approximate the evolution of the system, using the ode45 solver in MATLAB until the
solutions reach steady state.
While we consider PA and AME approaches here, we note that [70] used an approach for studying
adaptive SIS networks that treated the links as the objects, classifying them according to the disease
states while tracking the degree and number of infected neighbors at both end nodes. This link-based
method could generally improve the accuracy compared to AME; however, it also increases the number
of coupled equations from O(k2max) to O(k
4
max), where kmax is the maximum degree in the network.
4. Simulations of the CD-switching model
To test the accuracy of the approximations, we study simulated dynamics on networks with N = 1,000
nodes and M = 5,000 edges. That is, the mean degree of the network is fixed to be 〈k〉= 2M/N = 10.
We set the parameter α = 30 in the Fermi function used for imitating strategies. We study dynamics
for different initial fractions of defectors, denoted by ρ . We consider ρ = 0.5 first, and explore the
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influence of this parameter later. We draw the initial networks from an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi G(N,M) random
graph model of N nodes and M edges distributed uniformly and independently between the nodes. For
large N, the initial degree distribution is approximated by the Poisson distribution of mean 〈k〉, with the
probability of a selected node having degree k being pk = 〈k〉ke−〈k〉/k!. In the present model, updating
only discordant edges (i.e., CD), the dynamics stop when there are no discordant edges remaining.
Unless stated otherwise, we perform 1,000 simulations for each condition and report the average.
4.1 Final level of cooperation
To study the effect of the cost-benefit ratio u and strategy update rate w, we focus on the level of
cooperation obtained in the final (stationary) states of the model, starting from an initial fraction of
defectors ρ = 0.5. In Fig. 5, we present heat maps generated by simulations and AME approximations
of the final fractions of cooperating nodes and CC links. As qualitatively expected, the final fraction of
cooperating nodes is higher when the possible additional payoff for defecting, u, is smaller. When w is
close to 0, we observe a moderate level of cooperators, as expected because the discordant edges can
resolve themselves by rewiring with fewer strategy updates. Away from the small values of u or w, the
final network states are dominated by defectors. The AME approximation generally captures these high
and low cooperation regions of the (u,w) parameter space, up to a modest displacement in the precise
position of the phase transition.
In Fig. 6, we further explore the final level of cooperation and assess the accuracies of the two
semi-analytical approximations. In the left panel of Fig. 6, we consider w = 0, w = 0.05, w = 0.1, and
w= 0.5, plotting the final fraction of nodes in state C versus the cost-benefit ratio, u. There are three sets
of outcomes here: simulations (markers), PA (dotted lines), and AME (dashed lines). For w = 0, there
are no strategy updates and the final fraction of C nodes is fixed at 1−ρ . For w > 0, strategy updates
come into play with larger values of the cost-benefit ratio u driving stronger incentive for nodes to defect,
decreasing the final fraction of cooperators. As seen in the figure, the cases w= 0.1 and w= 0.5 include
higher levels of cooperation at small u that decrease slightly as u increases before suddenly dropping to
zero near u .= 0.2 and u .= 0.6, respectively. This phenomenon is qualitatively captured by both PA and
AME, though the quantitative description from AME is much more accurate, particularly in terms of
these critical points. In contrast, the PA prediction of the fraction of cooperators drops to zero at much
smaller values of u. Similarly, in the case w = 0.05, the level of cooperation in the simulation results
decreases with increasing u, but without the sharp dropoff; in contrast to both the simulations and AME,
the PA result drops to zero around u .= 0.9.
Similarly, in the right panel of Fig. 6 we plot the final fraction of cooperators C versus w for different
cost-benefit ratios, u= 0, u= 0.01, u= 0.2, and u= 0.8. For w= 0, no nodes update their strategies and
the final fraction of C nodes is 1−ρ = 0.5. Larger w increases both the number of strategy updates and
their overall effect on the final state. In the cases u = 0 and u = 0.01, u is so small that there is almost
no incentive to defect, so in the strategy updating consideration C’s and D’s are, holding everything
else equal, almost indistinguishable. However, in rewiring an edge the C node drops its D neighbor,
reducing the number of partners for D, and over time the D nodes experience lower payoffs because the
numbers of their neighbors decrease. This decrease in degree results in lower total payoff, increasing
the probability of a D node changing to a C strategy, leading to the dominance of C’s for small u.
In contrast, for u = 0.8, the C nodes become more disadvantaged with increased w since the payoff
of defecting is high, and the final fraction of cooperators decreases to zero around w .= 0.1. The case
u = 0.2 is intermediate between the competing effects of these two extremes. The final fraction of
cooperators increases for values of w that are not too large due to the above-described rewiring effect.
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FIG. 5. Results from simulations (left column) and Approximate Master Equations (AME) (right column) of the final fractions
of cooperators (top row) and CC edges (bottom row) for different combinations of the cost-benefit ratio u and strategy updating
probability w. The initial fraction of defectors is ρ = 0.5. For both the u and w axes, we use steps of 0.05 and plot the results
from stationary states. Simulation results here are averaged over 50 realizations at each parameter set. These visualizations were
generated from results on a regular grid through bilinear interpolation, leading to some clearly apparent grid artifacts. While
some discrepancies between simulation and AME results are clearly present, we note in particular that the position of the phase
transition in the (u,w) parameter space is well approximated by the AME system.
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FIG. 6. (Left) Final fraction of cooperators versus cost-benefit ratio u for different strategy updating probabilities w. Markers
are averages from 1,000 simulations, dotted lines are pair approximation (PA) results, and dashed lines are from approximate
master equations (AME). The PA results are different from those shown in [11], but we have confirmed the accuracy of our results
by personal communication with those authors. (Right) Final fraction of cooperators versus w for different cost-benefit ratio u.
Markers, dotted lines, and dashed lines again indicate simulations, PA, and AME, respectively. In both panels we observe that
AME is typically more accurate than PA, especially so near the phase transition where the fraction of cooperators goes to zero.
But sufficiently large strategy update rates (that is, fewer rewiring steps) combined with an apparently
sufficient incentive to defect leads to final network states dominated by defectors. In the simulations,
this transition for u = 0.2 appears to occur near w .= 0.4. While the PA and AME results qualitatively
describe all of these effects well, AME does a better job capturing this transition point. Taking these
results together, we note that in general the increased frequency of breaking and rewiring CD bonds
(i.e., smaller w) can directly support cooperation, in agreement with [60, 61], as observed here both in
terms of the apparent phase transition and the behavior at large u in the right panel of Fig. 6. But we
also note that the results include situations where increasing this frequency (decreasing w) decreases the
total level of cooperation, because of the complex interplay in the model dynamics.
4.2 Network dynamics
Having explored the populations in the final states, we consider how the networks evolve to those states.
Specifically, we investigate the evolution of five fundamental quantities of the networks: the fractions
of nodes in states C and D, and the fractions of edges that are CC, CD, and DD. We recall that the
total numbers of nodes and edges are constant during the dynamics, requiring both C+D fractions and
CC+CD+DD fractions to be equal to 1. We visualize the average trajectories through this phase space
for a collection of different (u,w) parameters in Fig. 7, starting from an initial fraction of defectors
ρ = 0.5 distributed across an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi G(N,M) random graph, comparing simulations with PA
and AME predictions. As such, the initial fraction of CC, DD, and CD edges is 0.25, 0.25, and 0.5,
respectively; that is, all networks start at C = 0.5, CC = 0.25, CD = 0.5. As the networks evolve, these
fractions change, tracing out trajectories in the (C,CD) and (CC,CD) coordinates in the figure. We
perform 50 simulations at each set of parameter values and compute the averages across simulations at
each time step. The networks evolve until there are no discordant edges (i.e. CD = 0).
For comparison, we include both PA and AME in the figure. While some features of the trajectories
14 of 24
0
0.25
0.5
(a) u = 0.2 and w = 0.1
CD
0
0.25
0.5
(c) u = 0.2 and w = 0.3
CD
0
0.25
0.5
(e) u = 0.5 and w = 0.1
CD
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.25
0.5
(g) u = 0.5 and w = 0.3
C
CD
(b) u = 0.2 and w = 0.1
(d) u = 0.2 and w = 0.3
(f) u = 0.5 and w = 0.1
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
(h) u = 0.5 and w = 0.3
CC
 
 
 sim.
 PA
 AME
FIG. 7. Phase space visualizations of the temporal evolution of the fraction of edges that are CD versus the fraction of nodes
that are C (left column) and versus the fraction of edges that are CC (right column) for different values of the cost-benefit ratio u
and strategy updating probability w (rows): (a&b) u = 0.2, w = 0.1, (c&d) u = 0.2, w = 0.3, (e&f) u = 0.5, w = 0.1, and (g&h)
u = 0.5, w = 0.3. Green lines are the averages of 50 simulations results, red dash-dot lines are the pair approximation (PA), and
blue dashed lines are the semi-analytical results of approximate master equations (AME). All networks start at C= 0.5, CC= 0.25,
CD = 0.5. As the system evolves, on average the number of CD decreases over time until none of these discordant edges remain
(CD = 0). Sufficiently far from the phase transition (as in the top and bottom rows), both approximations are reasonably good.
Near the phase transition there are ranges of parameters where only AME provides a good description (such as in the second row,
where PA incorrectly predicts the position relative to the phase transition; compare with the green markers and lines in the right
panel of Fig. 6). Also near the phase transition, there are other parameters where neither approximation captures the qualitative
behavior (as in the third row, with u = 0.5 and w = 0.1; compare with the location of the observed and predicted phase transition
in Fig. 5 and with the green markers and lines in the left panel of Fig. 6).
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FIG. 8. Degree distributions in the stationary states for different values of the cost-benefit ratio u and strategy updating probability
w: (a) u = 0.2, w = 0.1; (b) u = 0.2, w = 0.3; (c) u = 0.5, w = 0.1; and (d) u = 0.5, w = 0.3. Bars indicate averages from 50
simulations, with colors distinguishing the degree distributions of cooperator (blue) and defector (red) nodes. Blue and red lines
indicate the prediction from the semi-analytical approximate master equations (AME). We note the qualitatively good agreement
of the AME prediction with simulations, except in case (c) where AME predicts extinction of the cooperator nodes, as we have
previously seen (see Figure 6e&f).
are better captured than others, both methods in general do reasonably well qualitatively, with better
overall accuracy for AME, as seen in the figure. We note that both approximations are qualitatively
incorrect for the case u = 0.5, w = 0.1. Recalling the simulation and AME results in the Fig. 5 phase
diagram, we note that this parameter set is within the relatively narrow range between the observed
location of the phase transition and the AME prediction.
4.3 Degree distributions
The AME method utilizes more information and has higher computational cost than PA, but as we
have seen it generally provides a better approximation for the current model. Moreover, and unlike
PA, AME explicitly includes information about degree distributions. In Fig. 8, we plot the final state
degree distributions of C and D nodes, comparing the simulations and AME predictions. In each case,
since we initialize with random strategies on the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi G(N,M) random graph model, the initial
degree distributions are approximately Poisson (for large N). We examine degree distributions in the
final states, revisiting the same parameters considered previously: u = 0.2,w = 0.1; u = 0.2,w = 0.3;
u = 0.5,w = 0.1; and u = 0.5,w = 0.3. In the case u = 0.5,w = 0.3, it is perhaps not surprisingly
that AME gives an excellent prediction of the final degree distribution, since we observed excellent
prediction of the trajectory of the dynamics in this case above (Fig. 7) . In the final state of this case, D
nodes dominate the whole network, with no C nodes left.
In the other three cases, although the AME predictions are not as accurate, we can still see the AME
provides a qualitative picture of the final degree distribution. Once again, the worst case of the four
parameter sets visualized here is the u = 0.5, w = 0.1, where the AME prediction is on the wrong side
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FIG. 9. (Left) Fraction of cooperators remaining in the stationary state versus the initial fraction of defectors ρ , for strategy
updating probability w = 0.1 and various cost-benefit ratios u: 0, 0.1, ..., 1. (Right) Fraction of cooperators versus ρ for u = 0.2
and various strategy updating probabilities w: 0, 0.1, ..., 1.. In both figures, markers are the averages from 50 simulations and the
lines are the semi-analytical predictions from approximate master equations (AME).
of the phase transition.
4.4 The effect of the initial fraction of defectors, ρ
In Fig. 9 we explore the effect of the initial fraction of defectors, ρ . In this figure, we fix the parameter
to be w = 0.1 in the left panel and u = 0.2 in the right panel, changing the other parameter (u and w,
respectively) to view the final fraction of cooperators against ρ in stationary states, comparing simulation
results (markers) with our AME approximation (lines). By construction, all results in these panels
should connect the upper left and lower right corners because when ρ = 0 (respectively, ρ = 1) there
are no D (C) nodes, no discordant edges, and no dynamics.
In the left panel, for the different u curves, the final fraction of cooperators first gradually decreases
and then drops to zero suddenly at different values of ρ . AME predicts this qualitative behavior for dif-
ferent levels of u. Moreover, fixing w = 0.1, smaller u results in higher cooperation, since the incentive
of defecting is less when u is small.
In the right panel, fixing u = 0.2, the diagonal line is the case w = 0, where there are no strategy
updates and the cooperation level remains the same during the evolution. For small and moderate w,
the curves decrease with increasing ρ (though more quickly for smaller w), followed by a sharp drop
to zero at decreasing values of ρ for increased w. When w is large (greater rates of strategy updates),
the final cooperative level drops to zero for all non-zero ρ . As we show in this panel, the AME curves
suddenly drop to zero when w> 0.4.
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5. A model variant with DD rewiring
In this Section, we study a slightly different variant of the partner switching evolution game model,
also introduced by [11], where DD edges can also rewire as defector nodes seek out new partners that
they might better exploit. We are particularly interested in how this additional rewiring affects the final
cooperation level. In this variant, each time step starts by uniformly at random selecting from the union
of CD and DD edges. (Recall that only CD edges were selected in the original model above.) If a CD
edge is picked, the dynamics proceed as in the original model: with probability w, the strategy update
process happens; otherwise (that is, with probability 1−w) the C node along this edge unilaterally
drops the partnership with its D neighbor and rewires to another node. In contrast, if a DD edge is
picked, then with probability w nothing happens (there is no strategy update); otherwise (that is, with
probability 1−w) one of the two D ends, selected with equal probability, drops the connection and
rewires uniformly at random to another node in the network to whom it is not already connected. We
note that the total numbers of nodes, N, and edges, M, remain constant, as in the original model.
This variant model stops evolving when there are no CD or DD edges remaining in the system; that
is, all edges in a final, frozen state are CC. However, this does not require that all D nodes are removed
from the system, only that they are each left isolated with no connections. Another possibility, in which
the model variant as stated above never reaches a stopping condition, is that the system evolves to a
statistically stationary state where all C nodes have been removed so that all edges are DD edges and the
continued rewiring of these DD edges simply serves to repeatedly randomize the network of defector
nodes. Since in this case there are no C nodes left to emulate in a strategy update nor to connect to in a
rewiring, we do not consider the dynamics further beyond this event. Both of these cases are visualized
in Fig. 10. In the left panel, the C nodes own all of the edges, having isolated the exploitation efforts of
the D nodes. In the right panel, only D nodes remain and all edges are DD.
5.1 Semi-analytical methods of approximation
As before, we study this model variant with a combination of simulations and approximate analytic
models, comparing the pair approximation (PA) and approximate master equation (AME) approaches
with simulation results.
Following the notation of the original model in Sec. 3, the PA equations for this variant become.
dNC
dt
=w ·NCD · tanh
[
α
2
(piC−piD)
]
dNCC
dt
=w ·
(
NCDφC→D−2NCD NCCNC φD→C +NCD
NCD
ND
φC→D
)
+(1−w) · NC
N
NCD
dNDD
dt
=w ·
(
NCDφD→C−2NCD NDDND φC→D+NCD
NCD
NC
φD→C
)
− (1−w) · NC
N
NDD
(5.1)
where we note the only difference between equation (5.1) and equation (3.1) is the appearance of the
last term in the dNDD/dt equation. This term captures the possibility in this variant model for a D node
to dismiss its defective partner and rewire to a C node, thus decreasing the DD count.
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FIG. 10. Visualization of stationary states of the model variant with DD rewiring, for N = 1,000 nodes, M = 5,000 edges, and
initial fraction of defectors ρ = 0.5, for different parameters. Colors correspond to the two node states: cooperating (blue) and
defecting (red). (Left) For cost-benefit ratio u = 0.5 and strategy updating probability w = 0.1, D nodes remain in the system but
they have each been isolated with zero degree. (Right) For u = 1 and w = 0.5, the system evolves until only D nodes exist in the
network and all the edges are DD edges. These visualizations were created using the Yifan Hu layout in Gephi.
Similarly, we modify the AME equations to account for the rewiring of DD edges, yielding
dCk,l
dt
= w
{
φDk,l · (k− l)Dk,l−φCk,l · lCk,l
+φCD←CC · γC(l+1)Ck,l+1−φCD←CC · γClCk,l
+φCC←CD ·βC(k− l+1)Ck,l−1−φCC←CD ·βC(k− l)Ck,l
}
+(1−w)
{
NC
N
[
(l+1)Ck,l+1− lCk,l
]
+
NCD
N
[
Ck−1,l−Ck,l
]
+
NDD
N
[
Ck−1,l−1−Ck,l
]}
(5.2)
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FIG. 11. (Left) Fraction of cooperators remaining in the stationary state of the model variant with DD rewiring versus cost-benefit
ratio u, for different strategy updating probabilities w. Markers are averages from 1,000 simulations, dotted lines are the semi-
analytical results from pair approximation (PA), and the dashed lines are the semi-analytical results from approximate master
equations (AME). (Right) Fraction of cooperators remaining in the stationary state versus w for different u values, with markers
and lines as in the left panel.
dDk,l
dt
= w
{
−φDk,l · (k− l)Dk,l +φCk,l · lCk,l
+φDD←DC · γD(l+1)Dk,l+1−φDD←DC · γDlDk,l
+φDC←DD ·βD(k− l+1)Dk,l−1−φDC←DD ·βD(k− l)Dk,l
}
+(1−w)
{[
(k− l+1)Dk+1,l− (k− l)Dk,l
]
+
NCD
N
[
Dk−1,l−Dk,l
]
+
NC
2N
[
(l+1)Dk,l+1− lDk,l
]
+
NDD
N
[
Dk−1,l−1−Dk,l
]
+
1
2
[
(l+1)Dk+1,l+1− lDk,l
]}
(5.3)
Again, the additional terms here compared to equations (3.2) and (3.3) account for the rewiring of DD
edges, accounting for the rates of D nodes abandoning D neighbors and rewiring to C nodes, D nodes
passively gaining new connections through this rewiring, and D nodes being abandoned by their D
neighbors. Note the 1/2 factors in the last two lines of the Dk,l equation, accounting for an individual
node on a DD keeping and losing the edge.
5.2 Final level of cooperation
As before, we compare the final fraction of cooperators in the simulations versus the PA and AME
predictions. In the left panel of Fig. 11, we consider w = 0, w = 0.05, w = 0.1, and w = 0.5, plotting
the fraction of C nodes in the final states versus the cost-benefit ratio, u. In the right panel, we fix values
of u and vary w. Again, markers indicate simulation results, dotted lines are from the PA equations, and
dashed lines are from AME.
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Comparing Fig. 11 for this variant with the results in Fig. 6, the inclusion of DD rewiring here leads
to slightly larger final fractions of C nodes for small w > 0. In particular, whereas an existing DD link
in the original model can only be changed if the state of one of the two D nodes changes in a strategy
update, the DD rewiring in this variant increases the numbers of CD edges and thus leaves open the
possibility of C nodes becoming more favorable because of their yet higher degree. However, for larger
values of w, the more rapid rate of strategy updating leads to defectors dominating the system before the
cooperators can gain any advantage from increased degrees.
For further comparison, we consider the final fractions of C nodes and CC edges for different com-
binations of u and w in Fig. 12, as compared with the similar plots in Fig. 5. While many of the general
features remain the same in the presence of this DD-rewiring variant, a notable difference is in the final
fraction of CC edges for small w. In particular, at w= 0 (no strategy updates), the original model results
visualized in Fig. 5 limit to a final CC level of 0.75, since the initial DD edges (at 0.25 for ρ = 0.5)
cannot ever rewire under these settings. But these edges of course do rewire in the DD-rewiring variant,
leading CC to limit to 1 as w→ 0.
6. Conclusion
We have investigated a node-based Prisoner’s dilemma game played on a network coevolving with
player strategy updates. Our study includes two model variants for rewiring: one where only CD edges
can rewire, by C nodes dropping a link to a D neighbor in favor of a new partner; and a variant where
DD edges can also rewire. We explore the parameter space to investigate the competing effects of
strategy updates and partner switching, as well as the initial levels of cooperation versus defection. We
compare our simulations to the existing pair approximation (PA) developed in [11], and we develop an
approximation using approximate master equations (AME) to more accurately capture the transitions
between the properties of the final states of these models. We also use the AME method to estimate the
final-state degree distributions for different parameters.
We are particularly interested in the features that determine the final level of cooperation and overall
utility in the network. Revisiting Fig. 6, and the corresponding results for the model variant in Fig. 11,
it is clear that the most effective way to increase the final fraction of cooperators is to directly reduce
the cost-benefit ratio, u, so that players do not have as much incentive to defect. Alternatively, if the
strategy update rate w is small enough, the effects of rewiring give greater advantages to C nodes as
they accumulate larger numbers of playing partners, which then results in larger numbers of cooperators
through the strategy updates. Of course, one can also directly decrease the initial fraction of defectors.
The question of how to maximize the total utility or payoff relates to the types of edges. In the
partner-switching evolutionary game model we study here, the total number of nodes and edges remain
fixed, no matter how the networks and node states change. Utility comes from every edge in the network,
with each CC, CD, and DD edge contributing (from the two nodes) 2, 1+u, and 2u, respectively, where
u∈ (0,1). With no CD edges in the final state, maximizing the final overall utility reduces to maximizing
the number of CC links. In particular, comparing the right panels of Figs. 5 and 12 for the two model
variants, whether or not DD edges can rewire significantly affects the CC count (and thus the total system
utility) for small strategy update rates.
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FIG. 12. Results from simulations (left column) and Approximate Master Equations (AME) (right column) of the final fractions of
C nodes (top row) and CC links (bottom row) for different combinations of the cost-benefit ratio u and strategy updating probability
w in the model variant with DD rewiring. The initial fraction of defectors is ρ = 0.5. For both the u and w axes, we use steps
of 0.05 and plot the results from stationary states. Simulation results here are averaged over 50 realizations at each parameter
set. These visualizations were generated from results on a regular grid through bilinear interpolation, leading to some clearly
apparent grid artifacts. As in the original model without DD rewiring (Fig. 5), while some discrepancies between simulation and
AME results are clearly present, we note in particular that the position of the phase transition in the (u,w) parameter space is well
approximated by the AME system.
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